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DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 






A new theme has emerged in scholarly commentary on the U.S. Supreme 
Court and its role in American democracy.1 This theme, which this Article calls 
“democracy-assisting judicial review,” emphasizes the Court’s ability to offset or 
compensate for democratic deficits found in the other branches of government. 
With American policy-making increasingly plagued by polarization and gridlock, 
assessing the Court’s ability to overcome democratic dysfunctions is an important 
task. This Article seeks to contribute to this discussion by analyzing the potential 
for democracy-assisting judicial review and discussing reforms that might enhance 
the Court’s capacity to meet the challenge of today’s polarized politics.  
Part I of this Article explains the idea of democracy-assisting judicial review 
as expressed by several scholars, including, most recently, Professor Corinna 
Lain.2 Part II lays out a mostly negative assessment of this notion that courts can 
save the people from their democracy’s failings. It observes the dominance in 
American politics of interbranch partisan strategies that include the Court, which 
thereby limit the Court’s independence and, thus, its ability and desire to play a 
democracy-assisting role. This “regime politics” perspective, as the Article argues, 
enhances our understanding of Supreme Court decision making, even in a doctrinal 
area typically seen as a classic example of democracy-assisting judicial review—
reapportionment. Part III discusses how the rise of partisan polarization increases 
the need for democracy-assisting judicial review while reducing the Court’s 
capacity to provide it, with recent election-law decisions offering persuasive 
evidence. Part IV examines a variety of reforms that might improve how electoral 
and partisan forces shape the Court and enhance constitutional consensus building 
in these polarized times.  
 
I.  DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Professor Alexander Bickel claimed that judicial review is, problematically, a 
deviant institution that inevitably blocks majority will.3 His “counter-majoritarian 
                                                          
* © 2014 Terri Peretti. Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University. 
Comments and questions can be sent to the author at tperetti@scu.edu. 
1 “Re-emerged” is probably a more accurate term given John Hart Ely’s argument that 
judges should protect and enhance the democratic process. See generally JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
2 Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113 (2012). 
3 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962). 
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difficulty” construct dominated normative constitutional debate for decades. The 
contrary idea that courts can actually enhance democracy or advance majority will, 
thus, is unexpected and requires explanation. What follows is a brief review of the 
work of several different scholars who have advanced a democracy-assisting role 
for courts, with a more in-depth summary provided for the most recent 
contribution by Professor Lain.4 
 
A.  Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review 
 
It is impossible to begin a discussion of how courts can improve the 
functioning of American democracy without mentioning John Hart Ely. His 
process-perfecting or “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review 
famously argued that the Supreme Court’s sole legitimate role is to correct 
malfunctions in the democratic process.5 Instead of imposing substantive values in 
opposition to majority preferences, the Court should merely act as “a referee . . . 
interven[ing] only when one team is gaining an unfair advantage, not because the 
‘wrong’ team has scored.”6 This approach, Ely argues, is more consistent with the 
U.S. Constitution (which is mostly concerned with process), with democracy 
(since the Court is helping the people express and enforce their preferences), and 
with judicial capacity (as judges are “outsiders” who can better detect and correct 
political malfunctions).7 
Ely instructs the Court to engage in two types of representation-reinforcing 
activities. First, judicial review can legitimately be used to “facilitat[e] the 
representation of minorities”8 by striking down laws resulting from legislators’ 
prejudice or indifference. The Court also should act to “clear[] the channels of 
political change” by vigorously protecting free speech and the right to vote, 
ensuring equal and effective representation, and holding legislators responsible for 
making tough policy choices.9 Using these guides, Ely praises the Warren Court, 
particularly its reapportionment and civil rights decisions, and criticizes the Burger 
Court’s Roe v. Wade10 decision that imposed substantive, rather than 
participational, values.11 
 
B.  Upside-Down Judicial Review 
 
Professor Lain makes no such distinction between process and substance in 
her “upside-down” account of judicial review.12 Turning Bickel’s 
                                                          
4 Lain, supra note 2. 
5 ELY, supra note 1, at 102–04. 
6 Id. at 103. 
7 See id. at 90–104. 
8 Id. at 135. 
9 Id. at 105, 132–33. 
10 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
11 ELY, supra note 1, at 73–75, 144–49. 
12 Lain, supra note 2, at 175. 
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“countermajoritarian difficulty on its head,”13 she emphasizes the Court’s ability to 
vindicate majority preferences that have been denied by a malfunctioning 
legislative process.14 Central to this argument is her reversal of the institutional 
roles assigned by Bickel, suggesting that “the branches most majoritarian in theory 
may be least majoritarian in practice” and “the branch least majoritarian in theory 
may be most majoritarian in practice.”15 With regard to the former, she disputes 
the democratic pedigree of policies enacted by the elective branches due to a 
variety of impediments that are structural (e.g., the electoral college and equal state 
representation in the Senate), functional (e.g., the filibuster and congressional 
committee system), political (e.g., interest group influence and soaring incumbent 
reelection rates), and topic-specific (e.g., avoidance of issues that are “too hot” or 
“too cold”).16 Most of these impediments, Lain notes, “favor inertia, rendering it 
difficult both to pass majoritarian legislation and to repeal legislation that has later 
lost majoritarian backing.”17  
With regard to the Court being the least majoritarian institution theoretically 
but the most majoritarian in practice, Lain discusses various channels of 
democratic influence on the Court.18 Probably most important is an appointments 
process in which elected officials with “mainstream policy preferences” select 
Justices with similar “ideological leanings,” thereby ensuring that Justices will also 
have mainstream policy preferences.19 Unsurprisingly, the Court “has remained 
relatively ideologically balanced for decades, and there is reason to think it may 
well stay that way.”20 Additionally, its lack of enforcement powers renders 
political support for the Court and its decisions critically important. Furthermore, 
Supreme Court Justices are a product of their time and, thus, can be expected to act 
with “‘the main current of public sentiment’” rather than against it.21 There is also 
“the gravitational pull of dominant public opinion,” a force to which the Court’s 
moderate, swing Justices have been most responsive.22 All of these factors help to 
explain why “the Supreme Court, ironically enough, may be better positioned to 
effectuate majoritarian change.”23  
Democratic impediments in the elected branches and majoritarian influences 
on the Court both come into play in triggering the practice of upside-down judicial 
review. As Lain describes this dynamic, “[w]hen widespread attitudes change but 
the law does not, pressure builds to effectuate that change . . . . Free of the 
                                                          
13 Id. at 179.  
14 Id. at 148, 179.  
15 Id. at 145–46, 157.  
16 Id. at 146–57. 
17 Id. at 157. 
18 Id. at 157–67. 
19 Id. at 159. 
20 Id. at 165. 
21 Id. at 163–64 (quoting ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 
209 (2d ed. 1994)). 
22 Id. at 164–65. 
23 Id. at 183. 
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legislative logjams that stymie the representative branches, and moved by 
majoritarian proclivities of its own, the Court responds to, and reflects, prevailing 
norms otherwise frustrated in the democratic process.”24 The Court is not restricted 
to perfecting democratic processes, as in Ely’s approach, but instead actually 
“produc[es] majoritarian results.”25 
For supporting evidence, Lain examines three “classic cases of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty”26—Brown v. Board of Education,27 Furman v. 
Georgia,28 and Roe v. Wade—and portrays them instead as examples of upside-
down judicial review. Brown “presents a striking example of the Supreme Court 
responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in prevailing norms when the democratic 
process would not.”29 Even though Furman struck down the death penalty laws of 
thirty-nine states and the federal government and was repudiated by subsequent 
legislation in thirty-five states, there was considerable evidence that the justices 
“were applying[] upside-down judicial review.”30 Majority support for capital 
punishment seemed to be disappearing, and the death penalty had fallen into 
disuse, with prosecutors rarely willing to seek it and juries rarely willing to impose 
it, except for executions in the South administered primarily against poor blacks.31 
With Roe, Lain says, the Court actually sided with majority sentiment in opposing 
harsh, century-old abortion restrictions and more recent and modest abortion 
regulations, neither of which commanded public support by 1973.32 Additionally, 
the Catholic-led right-to-life lobby was successful in stalling legislative efforts to 
repeal existing laws, leading politicians to be greatly relieved when the Court took 
this divisive issue off their hands.33 Although these are only three examples, they 
obviously are important ones, and in Lain’s view, they are not exceptional. 
“Upside-down judicial review happens, and it happens enough to merit 
consideration in our normative theorizing about judicial review.”34  
Lain’s normative appraisal of upside-down judicial review is mixed because 
“[s]ome problems it makes better, others it makes worse.”35 She expresses concern 
about the Court intruding on states’ prerogatives and weakening federalism, 
imposing majoritarian values instead of constitutional principles, and enabling 
                                                          
24 Id. at 168. 
25 Id. at 117. 
26 Id. 
27 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
28 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
29 Lain, supra note 2, at 125. 
30 Id. at 132. 
31 Id. at 126–30. 
32 Id. at 135–37 (citing public opinion poll data to demonstrate support for elective 
abortions and hypothesizing that public support was due to archaic laws that endangered 
women who sought abortions).  
33 Id. at 139–43; see also id. at 143 (“The Supreme Court in Roe had indeed taken an 
issue from the legislature—but it was not an issue that the legislature wanted to keep.”). 
34 Id. at 178. 
35 Id. at 179. 
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politicians to avoid responsibility.36 In the end, however, her assessment is 
positive: the Court “facilitates” rather than “thwarts” majority will so that “in an 
unexpected and upside-down way, democracy never worked so well.”37 
 
C.  Majoritarian Judicial Review 
 
Lain is not alone in highlighting the Supreme Court’s ability to enhance 
American democracy. Professors Barry Friedman and Jeffrey Rosen have both 
portrayed the Court as an institution that is highly capable of satisfying the people 
with its majoritarian judgments. Friedman emphasizes the “dialogic system of 
determining constitutional meaning” in which the Court’s decisions align with 
public opinion “over time.”38 For Rosen, the judiciary is “the most democratic 
branch” and, “[f]ar from protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority 
or thwarting the will of the people, courts for most of American history have 
tended to reflect the constitutional views of majorities.”39 Courts, furthermore, are 
most successful when practicing “democratic constitutionalism” and deferring to 
the public’s views.40 This is especially important today as a polarized Congress no 
longer “court[s] the moderate center” and seeks to enlist the judiciary in their 
extremist causes.41 Judges must, in Rosen’s view, resist this “invitation to 
unilateralism” because “[t]he courts can best serve the country in the future as they 
have served it in the past: by reflecting and enforcing the constitutional views of 
the American people.”42 
 
D.  Second-Best Constitutionalism 
 
A somewhat different type of democracy-assisting judicial review comes from 
Professor Adrian Vermuele. His idea of “second-best constitutionalism” permits 
courts to tolerate a particular constitutional defect or imperfection if it compensates 
for another imperfection and helps to bring the nation closer to a constitutional 
ideal.43 For example, while the legislative veto may not be constitutionally 
sanctioned by literalism or originalism, it could nevertheless be supported as an 
effective offset for another entrenched constitutional deformity: excessive 
legislative delegation of power to the executive branch. While neither excessive 
                                                          
36 Id. at 179–81. 
37 Id. at 179. 
38 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 382 
(2009). 
39 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE 
AMERICA xii (2006). 
40 Id. at 210. 
41 Id. at 4.  
42 Id. at 210. 
43 Adrian Vermuele, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 
426 (2003). 
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delegations nor legislative vetoes are preferred, having both more effectively 
achieves the constitutional goal of balanced power between Congress and the 
executive. Vermuele expresses some concerns about second-best constitutionalism, 
particularly the pursuit of constitutional goals through unconstitutional means and 
the capacity of judges to assess second-best constitutional arguments. However, 
like Lain, Rosen, and Friedman, he believes that courts can enhance the operation 
and performance of American democracy and, thus, accepts the possibility of 
defensible, democracy-assisting judicial review.44 
 
II.  DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING REVIEW, REGIME POLITICS, AND THE CASE OF 
REAPPORTIONMENT 
 
This Article applauds the efforts of scholars like Lain and Rosen to challenge 
the countermajoritarian difficulty and think more realistically about the actual role 
the Supreme Court plays in the American political system. However, these works 
do not go far enough. Most importantly, they fail to acknowledge the critical role 
of interbranch partisan strategies in American policy making. Because these 
strategies include the Supreme Court, its independence and the likelihood of its 
acting in a democracy-assisting manner are reduced. As this Article explains, the 
regime-politics approach places interbranch partisan activities at its center, helping 
to provide a more complete understanding of the Court’s decisions. This will be 
demonstrated in a doctrinal area that is typically seen as a model of democracy-
assisting judicial review—reapportionment. 
 
A.  The Regime-Politics Approach 
 
Regime politics is a school of thought claiming that judicial review is 
politically constructed.45 In other words, politicians seek to enhance the regime’s 
electoral and policy success by carefully structuring, empowering, and populating 
courts. As Professor Mark Graber explains,  
 
Elected officials sponsor judicial review by establishing and expanding 
federal jurisdiction, by nominating and confirming justices known to be 
willing to declare laws unconstitutional, by easing access to courts and 
providing resources to litigants who are making constitutional attacks on 
courts, by adopting procedures that enable litigants to discover and prove 
constitutional violations, by adopting vague statutory language that must 
                                                          
44 Id. at 436.  
45 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY (2007); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative 
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36–37 (1993); Keith E. 
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of 
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 593–94 
(2005) [hereinafter Political Supports].  
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be interpreted by courts, and by refusing to pass anticourt legislation in 
response to public attacks on courts.46 
 
According to this view, constitutional law becomes a collaborative project, 
with courts crafting legal doctrines that aid and advance the ideological 
commitments they share with their partisan allies in the other branches. Judicial 
assistance can come in a variety of forms:  
 
Justices impose majoritarian policies on outlier states, provide insurance 
when dominant coalitions suffer electoral defeats, enable elected officials 
to avoid taking firm stands on hotly contested political issues, provide a 
policymaking alternative when elected institutions are gridlocked, 
resolve issues lacking the political salience necessary to attract 
legislative attention, and facilitate position taking by announcing policies 
that crucial elites support but cannot publicly endorse.47  
 
Given that the American political system is highly fragmented and replete with 
veto points that enable obstruction, the opportunities for judicial assistance are 
abundant. 
Evidence supporting the regime-politics model comes mostly from case 
studies that reinterpret significant episodes in constitutional history. Professor 
Howard Gillman, for example, has described the efforts of the Republican Party in 
the post-bellum period to transform federal policy and institutions to facilitate 
national economic development; in the face of electoral vulnerability, they 
entrenched their economic policy preferences by enhancing the power of federal 
courts and staffing them with conservatives.48 Professor Martin Shapiro has 
characterized Carolene Products’ Footnote Four as a New Deal political bargain 
dressed up in constitutional language; after all, it directs courts to withhold 
assistance from New Deal enemies (businesses) and to extend it to New Deal allies 
(left-leaning intellectuals, racial and ethnic minorities, and the voting masses).49 
My previous research shows that the Court’s state-action doctrine in the mid-
twentieth century developed in collaboration with Democratic Party leaders, 
especially in the executive branch. The Court first stretched state-action rules in 
order to reach and forbid private race discrimination (e.g., in primary elections and 
housing); it then tightened them once the Democratic Party freed itself from 
conservative Southern control, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and no longer 
                                                          
46 Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to 
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 364 (2008). 
47 Id. 
48 Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their 
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 
521–22 (2002). 
49 Martin M. Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 74, 85 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).  
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needed the Court’s assistance to accomplish its policy goals.50 Professor Kevin 
McMahon explains how President Richard Nixon successfully shifted the Supreme 
Court in a conservative direction on the issues of greatest concern to him—busing 
and law and order—as part of his electoral strategy of rebuilding the Republican 
coalition by appealing to conservative whites in the South and working-class 
Catholics in the urban Northeast.51 More recent work by Professors Cornell 
Clayton, J. Mitchell Pickerill, and Lucas McMillan has documented how the “New 
Right Republican regime,” beginning with President Nixon’s election in 1968 and 
consolidated with President Reagan’s two victories, employed a broad and 
intensive judicial strategy seeking conservative legal outcomes on a variety of 
issues like criminal justice, federalism, religion, abortion, and affirmative action.52 
Scholars in the comparative law field also have offered evidence that the political 
construction of judicial review is not a uniquely American phenomenon.53 Elites in 
emerging democracies also empower and shape courts as a way to consolidate and 
protect their power.54  
The activities of courts in these regime-politics accounts represent “friendly” 
judicial review, rather than majoritarian judicial review. This is an important 
distinction. Rather than acting independently to vindicate majority will in the face 
of legislative failure, courts have advanced the goals and interests of the partisan 
regime of which they are a part. The fact that their decisions were often consistent 
with majority preferences is unsurprising since party regimes attain power by 
winning popular support. Any congruence with public opinion, however, is 
incidental and a product of the Court’s political dependence rather than its political 
independence.  
 
B.  The Case of Reapportionment 
 
A closer look at constitutional developments in the reapportionment field 
helps to demonstrate these points. The Court’s reapportionment decisions are often 
presented as a classic tale of democracy-assisting judicial review. In Baker v. 
                                                          
50 Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 273, 274–75 (2010).  
51 KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM 
AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 148–49 (2011). 
52 Cornell W. Clayton & Lucas K. McMillan, The Roberts Court in an Era of 
Polarized Politics, 10 FORUM J. APPLIED RES. CONTEMP. POL. 132, 132–33 (2013); Cornell 
W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right 
Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 
1386–87 (2006); see also J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court 
and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233, 240–41 (2004). 
53 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 3 (2003).  
54 See id. at 17–21; RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–12 (2004). 
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Carr,55 the Supreme Court intervened reluctantly, problematically, but out of 
necessity, to compensate for a deeply rooted malfunction in the political process 
and sought to achieve higher constitutional ideals of fair representation and 
political equality.56 This account is incomplete, however, failing to answer critical 
questions regarding the particular timing of the Court’s intervention and its 
strongly egalitarian character. A regime-politics perspective that highlights 
interbranch partisan strategies is better able to answer those questions.  
The now-familiar story begins in 1946, with Colegrove v. Green.57 There, the 
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Illinois’s congressional districts that gave 
voters in the most populous district one-ninth the voting power of those in the 
smallest district.58 It dismissed the complaint in a 4–3 vote, with Justice 
Frankfurter asserting that it was “hostile to a democratic system to involve the 
judiciary in the politics of the people” and famously warning that courts “ought not 
to enter this political thicket.”59 He advised underrepresented urban residents to 
pursue reform through the ballot box and the political process, not the courts.60 A 
dramatic change occurred in 1962 in Baker v. Carr. Memphis residents had 
claimed a denial of equal protection due to the Tennessee legislature’s failure to 
redistrict, despite major population shifts since the last redistricting in 1901 that 
rendered their vote one-tenth the value of that of rural residents.61 After a lengthy 
and discordant decision-making process,62 the Court ruled in a 6–2 vote that 
malapportionment was indeed a justiciable issue.63 Justice Clark initially sided 
with Justice Frankfurter but switched his vote because, as explained in his 
concurrence, voters had no practical avenues for reform and were “caught up in a 
legislative strait jacket.”64 Tennessee had no initiative or referendum, 
                                                          
55 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
56 See id. at 236–37.  
57 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
58 Id. at 556; id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).  
59 Id. at 553–54, 556.  
60 See id. at 556. 
61 Id. at 193–95.  
62 Some accounts credit the Baker case for Justice Whittaker’s health problems and 
early retirement, and Justice Frankfurter reportedly blamed Baker for the two strokes he 
suffered fewer than two weeks later. See, e.g., Kim I. Esler, A Defense of Activism, 40 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 920 n.25 (1996) (“Whittaker quit and Frankfurter suffered 
a stroke, presumably related to the stress of the defeat.”); Carlo A. Pedrioli, Instrumentalist 
and Holmesian Voices in the Rhetoric of Reapportionment: The Opinions of Justices 
Brennan and Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 31 n.327 (2013) 
(“According to Solicitor General Archibald Cox, a former mentee of Justice Frankfurter, 
Frankfurter expressed to Cox that Baker had been responsible for the justice’s deteriorating 
health.”). 
63 Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
64 Id. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring); Memorandum from Justice Tom C. Clark to 
Justice Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 7, 1962), available at http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/clark/vie 
w_doc.php?id=a120-02-02 (explaining the decision not to join the dissent in Baker v. 
Carr). 
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constitutional conventions could only be called by the legislature, and state courts 
had refused to intervene.65  
Questions quickly emerged over an appropriate judicial remedy, with the 
Court providing considerable clarity by 1964. In Wesberry v. Sanders,66 the Court 
interpreted the requirement in Article I, Section 2, that representatives be chosen 
“by the People of the several States” to mean that “as nearly as is practicable[,] one 
man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”67 
Thus, House districts were bound by the “one person, one vote” principle of equal 
representation. In Reynolds v. Sims,68 the Court extended this principle to state 
legislatures, requiring districts in both houses to be “as nearly of equal population 
as is practicable.”69 Even when overwhelmingly approved by voters themselves, 
deviation from this standard was not allowed.70 The Court additionally required a 
very high degree of mathematical precision in the drawing of legislative districts, 
at least for the House of Representatives. For example, it struck down a plan in 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler71 with an average interdistrict disparity of 1.6%72 and 
another in Karcher v. Daggett73 where the largest disparity was 0.7%.74 The 
Court’s remedy was clearly and strictly egalitarian. 
Baker and its progeny appear to be a good fit for a democracy-assisting 
judicial review framework. First, there clearly existed an entrenched democratic 
malfunction. Massive migration had occurred from rural to urban areas in the first 
half of the twentieth century, and the traditional approach of representing 
geographic entities, such as towns and counties, produced severe 
malapportionment.75 Additionally, legislative incumbents and their rural 
constituencies had no incentive to address this problem, and “inequities in 
representation . . . widened substantially;” in fact, the largest interdistrict disparity 
in terms of representation per resident grew “from 6 to 1 in 1910 to 20 to 1 in 
1950, and then to 35 to 1 in 1960.”76 Legislatures at the mid-twentieth century 
mark were, as Professor Lucas Powe writes, “ruled ‘by the hog lot and the cow 
                                                          
65 Baker, 369 U.S. at 259 (Clark, J., concurring). 
66 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
67 Id. at 7–8. 
68 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
69 Id. at 577. 
70 See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964) 
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees an individual’s right to cast an equally 
weighted vote, even though the majority of Colorado’s electorate approved the 
apportionment scheme). 
71 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
72 Id. at 529 n.1.  
73 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
74 Id. at 728. 
75 See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: 
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 39–40 
(2008). 
76 Id. at 31.  
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pasture.’”77 The policy consequences were predictable: significantly lower per 
capita state spending in metropolitan areas and a nationwide failure to address 
pressing urban problems involving race, poverty, education, and housing.78  
Federal court intervention was seen as an imperfect but necessary “second-
best” solution, with the Court itself employing democracy-assisting language in 
defending its decisions. 
 
We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets and 
mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionally 
protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office 
require no less of us. . . . To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is 
debased, he is that much less a citizen. . . . A nation once primarily rural 
in character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes once 
fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the basic principle 
of representative government remains . . . the weight of a citizen’s vote 
cannot be made to depend on where he lives. . . . This is an essential part 
of the concept of a government of laws and not men. This is at the heart 
of Lincoln’s vision of “government of the people, by the people, [and] 
for the people.”79 
 
Rather than careful analysis rooted in the text and its original meaning, the post-
Baker cases offered the irrefutable logic of democratic principles. In Reynolds, for 
example, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that it was only “logical[]” and 
“reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that 
State’s legislators.”80 Similarly, given that “the right to elect legislators in a free 
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system,” it was 
“inconceivable” that a state law that in effect multiplies some citizens’ votes “by 
two, five, or 10 . . . could be constitutionally sustainable.”81 Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s persuasive historical analysis to the contrary would not stand in the way 
of such inexorable democratic commands. 
The Court’s revolutionary reapportionment decisions were quickly accepted 
and widely praised. By 1967, “every state had complied with the philosophy 
expressed by the Court . . . [and] adopted state legislative and U.S. House districts 
with nearly equal populations.”82 Improved representational accuracy in turn 
helped to bring about a more equitable distribution of revenues within states and an 
increase in education and welfare spending in the Midwest and Northeast.83 
Perhaps it is not surprising then that former Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke of 
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Baker v. Carr as the “most important case of my tenure on the Court.”84 The Court 
has also received mostly positive marks from legal scholars, including Ely, who 
regarded malapportionment as precisely the sort of representational defect the 
Court should correct, and Rosen, who viewed the Court’s efforts to “break the 
political logjam” over redistricting as evidence of its “ability to promote 
democracy.”85 
The democracy-assisting version of the reapportionment story has limitations, 
however. For example, it fails to help us answer a simple but important question: 
why 1962, rather than 1952 or 1942 or 1932 or 1922? After all, malapportionment 
was a serious nationwide problem well before 1962. In fact, Congress failed to 
reapportion House seats after the 1920 census, which had revealed majority status 
for urban residents for the first time in history.86 Malapportionment then worsened 
considerably over the next four decades and existed in the House of 
Representatives and in nearly every state legislative house.87 Why, then, had the 
Court waited until the 1960s to intercede and employ democracy-assisting review? 
And why did it choose such a strict egalitarian standard, despite the existence of 
“the federal analogy” (i.e., the Senate) and the absence of a clear equality mandate 
from the Constitution’s text and history?  
The Court’s timing and its egalitarianism make sense, however, when we 
adopt a regime-politics lens and reflect on the electoral success, policy aims, and 
interbranch strategies of the Democratic regime. From 1932 through 1964, the 
Democratic Party experienced extraordinary success in national elections, winning 
the White House seven out of nine times and control of both houses of Congress 
sixteen out of eighteen times.88 That success paid off handsomely in terms of 
partisan control of the judiciary. Especially relevant to the timing issue, President 
Kennedy’s replacement in 1962 of Justice Charles Whittaker with Justice Byron 
White and Justice Felix Frankfurter with Justice Arthur Goldberg had an enormous 
impact on the ideological composition and direction of the Supreme Court. The 
percentage of conservative decisions made by the Court fell from 42% in the 1960 
term to 22% in the 1962 term.89 Using Martin-Quinn ideology scores (with 
negative numbers indicating a liberal orientation and positive numbers indicating a 
conservative orientation), the ideological location and identity of the median 
Justice changed dramatically from 0.533 (Justice Stewart) in the 1960 term 
to -0.046 (Justice White) in the 1961 term, to -0.808 (Justice Goldberg) in the 1962 
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term, and to -0.874 (Justice Brennan) in the 1963 term.90 The Court’s strong shift 
to the left should not be a surprise, given Democratic domination at the polls and, 
thus, Democratic control of judicial appointments.  
The timing of the Court’s intervention also makes sense when we look at the 
leadership and cooperation of the Kennedy administration with respect to 
redistricting. President Kennedy made “the crisis of the cities” an important part of 
his presidential campaign, and he wooed the urban vote, beginning when he was a 
senator in the late 1950s.91 He claimed that the litany of ills plaguing America’s 
cities—crime, poverty, overcrowding, scarce housing, and inferior education—
were caused by “political discrimination” against and underrepresentation of the 
urban majority.92 Once in power, President Kennedy lent support to the 
reapportionment cause. One of the lawyers in the Baker case knew Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy and had worked with Solicitor General Archibald Cox on 
President Kennedy’s presidential campaign.93 The Baker attorneys had hoped, but 
were unable, to discuss their case and cause with Attorney General Kennedy.94 
They nonetheless had a lengthy meeting with Solicitor General Cox and Deputy 
Attorney General Byron White.95 After discussing the matter with the Attorney 
General, Cox decided to file an amicus brief in the Baker case.96 
The Kennedy administration vigorously argued in Baker for judicial 
assistance in correcting the representational distortions created by legislators’ 
refusal to redistrict and offered enthusiastic support for the ruling after the decision 
was made.97 President Kennedy expressed his approval of Baker at his first press 
conference following the decision, reminding the public and press that his 
administration had urged the Court to do the right thing and intervene since “the 
right to fair representation and to have each vote counted equally is, it seems to 
me, basic to the successful operation of a democracy.”98 Other executive branch 
officials publicly praised the ruling as well, including Robert Kennedy, who stated 
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that Baker was “a landmark in the development of representative government.”99 
The administration stayed active in the reapportionment litigation that followed,100 
and President Kennedy’s view that each vote should count equally became Court 
doctrine. 
Baker, Wesberry, and Reynolds are indeed majoritarian decisions, but not in 
the sense employed by Lain and Rosen. The Court did not respond directly to 
popular pressure or seek, virtuously and independently, to vindicate democratic 
values. Rosen’s complaint that the Court need not have been so rigidly egalitarian 
and could have used the Guarantee Clause to open a dialogue with state 
legislatures101 shows his misreading of the Court’s policy interventions in this area. 
By 1964, the Court consisted solidly of active and loyal members of the dominant 
Democratic regime. As Powe puts it, the Warren Court was “a functioning part of 
the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism”102 pursuing civil rights and the Great Society and 
battling Southern outliers on issues of race, religion, and criminal justice. Strict 
equality, imposed by the judicial members of this broad, powerful, and united 
Democratic coalition, should not be a surprising policy choice. Furthermore, and as 
Whittington points out, Baker is not an example of the Court “simply acting on 
behalf of popular majorities;” rather, it “cut[] through the ‘political thicket’” 
assisting “liberal Democrats who had long chaffed [sic] at the legislative obstacle 
posed by entrenched conservatives.”103  
Finally, the implementation and impact of the Court’s reapportionment 
decisions had a decidedly Democratic cast, lending further support to a regime-
politics interpretation. Professors Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz found significant 
effects resulting from the fact that redistricting plans were being evaluated and 
supervised by federal judges, who mostly belonged to the Democratic Party (again, 
a legacy of its longstanding electoral success).104 With Baker, the Supreme Court 
changed the strategic redistricting game by introducing a new player: federal court 
judges. It was no longer the case that previous district lines would stay in place if 
the legislature and governor could not agree to a new plan. Now a federal judge, 
and most likely a Democratic judge, could impose a new plan. This “reversionary 
outcome” affected the negotiation process, with the legislature sometimes agreeing 
to a new plan to avoid a worse plan that a (probably) Democratic judge might 
impose.105 In the end, three factors—the Baker decision, a predominantly 
Democratic federal judiciary, and the 1964 Democratic landslide—combined to 
produce “the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of 
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congressional votes into seats outside the South.”106 Professors Cox and Katz 
convincingly portray judges, not as neutral democracy-assisting reformers, but as 
regime allies in a strategic partisan game. 
 
III.  DEMOCRACY-ASSISTING REVIEW IN THE MODERN POLARIZED ERA 
 
What accounts for the persistence of the idea of democracy-assisting judicial 
review, given that it cannot adequately explain one of its presumably best 
examples? The timing of its reemergence in constitutional commentary is neither 
surprising nor accidental. The United States finds itself amid what many regard as 
a severe political crisis, with polarization among partisan elites playing a central 
role.107 The hope that courts can resolve or ameliorate this crisis is understandable, 
but it is futile given that polarized elites construct and shape those judicial 
institutions. Recent election-law decisions are particularly instructive on this point. 
A clear sign of the current political crisis is found in public opinion surveys 
showing that three-quarters of Americans are “dissatisfied with the way things are 
going in the United States at this time,”108 and 14% of Americans approved of 
Congress’s job performance in 2013, the lowest annual average since Gallup began 
measuring it in 1974.109 Many blame partisan polarization.110 The two major 
parties have become more internally united, while also becoming more 
ideologically distant from each other.111 Put another way, there are very few 
moderates left in Congress to help forge a path to legislative compromise. As a 
result, many issues (most conspicuously, those involving the budget) spark heated 
debate and intractable disputes, with Republicans and Democrats unable to reach 
agreement and, at times, unwilling to talk to one another. The federal government 
was forced to shut down for sixteen days in October 2013, and a disastrous 
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financial default was narrowly averted with a last-minute extension of the federal 
debt limit.112 Polarization, divided government, and the Senate filibuster have 
presented an extraordinary challenge even for ordinary lawmaking. Congressional 
gridlock, in turn, has triggered additional problems for democratic governance, 
including an increased likelihood of unilateral action by a frustrated president.113 
Whether these dysfunctions are a product of an increase in partisan polarization or 
are constitutionally hardwired as some have argued,114 there are few who do not 
believe that the American political system is broken and in need of repair. 
Given its traditional reputation for independence and impartiality, the 
judiciary presents an appealing savior. A special democracy-assisting function 
enables courts to rescue the people from their dysfunctional politics while easing 
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the court’s intervention. Relying on 
the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, to save America from its polarized 
politics, however, offers false hope. To the degree that the regime-politics model is 
valid, the Court is an integral part of the partisan coalitions that dominate 
American democracy, which means it is also an integral part of the polarized 
politics that currently dominate American democracy. How, then, could it have the 
capacity or motivation to fix the dysfunctional politics of which it is a part?115 
Recent election-law decisions are illustrative. Professor Garrett Epps claimed 
that—whether in campaign finance, voting rights, or partisan gerrymandering—the 
Roberts Court has significantly contributed to “the train wreck that is 21st century 
American democracy. . . . [W]hen we lament polarization, the declining respect for 
democracy, the bitterness of the national dialogue, the dominance of money in 
politics, and the life-and-death struggle over the right to vote, we are lamenting 
trends either born in or enabled by the Supreme Court.”116 In support of Epps’ 
claim, there is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,117 in which the 
Court removed limits on independent campaign expenditures by corporations and 
labor unions from the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, allowing 
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nearly a billion dollars of independent spending to flow into the 2012 election 
process, half from super PACs and most invested in negative advertising.118 In 
Crawford v. Marion County Board of Elections,119 the Court upheld Indiana’s 
photo identification law and opened the floodgates for new voter identification 
laws throughout the states.120 And in Shelby County v. Holder,121 the Court 
effectively freed many states and localities of preclearance requirements under the 
Voting Rights Act by striking down Section 4(b)’s preclearance coverage formula, 
spawning new voting restrictions, particularly in the South.122 It is difficult to 
argue that the Roberts Court enhanced democracy with these decisions. 
It is particularly difficult to claim that, with these decisions, the Roberts Court 
acted to rescue the people from political dysfunction or partisan stalemate, as 
suggested by Lain’s version of democracy-assisting judicial review. Regarding 
Shelby County, for example, Congress had reauthorized the preclearance 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act on four occasions,123 including in 2006 
when it extended Section 5 for another twenty-five years.124 Whether motivated by 
“racial entitlement” or not,125 Congress voted overwhelmingly for the extension, 
with a 92% affirmative vote in the House and a unanimous vote in the Senate.126 In 
contrast to this extraordinary congressional consensus, the Supreme Court’s vote 
was sharply divided and highly partisan. The five Republican Justices, all 
appointed by Republican presidents, voted to invalidate the preclearance coverage 
formula, while the four Democratic Justices, all appointed by Democratic 
presidents, voted to uphold it.127 
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While the Court’s recent election-law decisions are difficult to characterize as 
democracy-assisting, they are much easier to characterize as partisan. It certainly 
appears that in Crawford, Citizens United, and Shelby County, a Republican-
dominated Court decided consistently with policy positions advanced by the 
Republican Party, whether in its national platforms, amicus briefs, or legislative 
proposals.128 This is an unsurprising result of the fact that party elites do not 
appoint democracy assisters to the bench. Especially in polarized times, politicians 
will seek to appoint copartisans who share the party’s (increasingly off-center) 
ideological commitments and believe in its (increasingly off-center) constitutional 
vision. The Republican Party, furthermore, has over the last half-century strongly 
featured judicial philosophy in its “party brand.”129 In communicating that brand to 
voters and supporters, Republican presidents have mostly nominated strong 
conservatives to the Court—Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, Robert Bork, 
Douglas Ginsburg, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, and Samuel 
Alito. On rare occasion, they have made strategic mistakes, like Justices David 
Souter and Harry Blackmun. They have sometimes chosen moderates, like Justices 
Anthony Kennedy and John Paul Stevens, but only when forced to by a 
Democratic Senate. The result today, factoring in the White House victories of 
Presidents Clinton and Obama, is a Roberts Court that is both very conservative 
and very divided—exactly like the electoral politics that produced it.130 Such a 
Court is unlikely and unable to act as an external and independent mechanism for 
fixing the dysfunctional politics of which it is a part. 
 
IV.  FINDING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS IN A POLARIZED POLITY 
 
Given this reality, it seems wise to abandon the democracy-assisting idea and 
focus instead on more pressing challenges for judicial review in a polarized polity. 
One such challenge is how to protect the Court from being easily captured by 
extreme and unrepresentative partisan elements, a concern echoed by Rosen.131 
Such a Court may risk its public legitimacy as it comes to look more and more like 
Congress in that it, too, is sharply divided into two distinct and distant partisan 
groupings.132 Such a Court might also produce what Mark Graber calls 
“constitutional yo-yos” or “dramatic swings in judicial policy making.”133 
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Partisan polarization threatens the ongoing (and endless) process of finding, 
building, and expressing consensual constitutional values in the United States. An 
important, though not exclusive, part of that process is the appointment of new 
Supreme Court Justices. The way the Constitution structures judicial appointments 
ensures that the party winning the White House and Senate also wins the right to 
influence the Supreme Court. The opportunity to plant its constitutional vision on 
the Court is one of its electoral prizes.134 As popular preferences change and party 
fortunes ebb and flow, new Justices and new viewpoints are added to the Court. If 
a party is able to build a successful and durable electoral coalition, as the 
Democratic Party did with its New Deal coalition, it will be able to exert 
significant control over the courts and secure its desired constitutional policies. 
The problem with partisan polarization is that it can distort this process of planting 
constitutional values on the Court and building a constitutional consensus. An off-
center, unrepresentative President will try to plant off-center, unrepresentative 
constitutional values on the Court. If an off-center, unrepresentative Senate 
cooperates with that endeavor, we face a significant problem for democracy and 
for constitutional consensus building, particularly given the increasingly lengthy 
terms served by the Justices.  
This Symposium invited participants to think about reforms or adaptations 
that would improve institutional performance in polarized times. This Article does 
so without a concern for the likelihood of their adoption. This was, ironically, a 
product of an initial pessimism about the reform enterprise. After all, any reform 
would need to be adopted by America’s gridlocked political process—a highly 
unlikely outcome. Instead of giving up and dispensing with the entire exercise, 
however, this Article chooses to accept the invitation and freely and openly 
consider a variety of reforms that could aid and support representational, 
consensus-building processes. 
To that end, the remainder of this Part discusses three types of reforms that (a) 
increase and regularize turnover on the Court, (b) promote the appointment of 
more representative Justices, and (c) help to elect more representative presidents 
and senators. These reforms do not seek to weaken the partisan and electoral forces 
that operate on the Court since those forces help to keep judicial review 
democratically accountable. Rather, they aim to improve the way they work in an 
increasingly polarized environment. 
Supreme Court Turnover. It seems logical to expect that successful party 
regimes will inevitably and regularly receive appointment opportunities that enable 
them to shape the Court. The historical record tells a different story. Because 
Article III leaves the Justices free to depart whenever they please, the timing of 
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vacancies is left nearly to chance. That is especially true for “distal” vacancies—
those in which a President is able to “move the Court median” because the 
departing Justice resides at or on the opposite side of the Court median from the 
president.135 Some presidents have been granted no vacancies at all (President 
Carter) or no distal vacancies, even when winning two terms (Presidents 
Eisenhower, Clinton and, thus far, Obama). Other presidents have been blessed 
with multiple vacancies (President Reagan) or even multiple distal vacancies 
(President Kennedy), even when lacking partisan control of Congress (Presidents 
Nixon and H.W. Bush).  
The problem with this unequal distribution of appointment opportunities is 
that the process by which the Court is regularly “refreshed” with new values either 
moves too fast or too slow. The values and preferences expressed in multiple 
elections might be underrepresented on the Court if no vacancies occur, as was the 
case during an eleven-year span from 1994 to 2005. Values and preferences 
expressed in a single election, like President Nixon’s in 1968, might receive more 
representation than they deserve, for example, with the four distal vacancies 
President Nixon received in his first term.136 This is especially problematic if 
extreme party elites have momentarily gained power yet are able to gain long-term 
representation of their constitutional views. 
Several law professors have proposed solving this problem by replacing life 
tenure with eighteen-year staggered terms, enabling a new Justice to be appointed 
every two years.137 Regularized turnover would equalize presidential influence 
over the Court and tie its membership and policy direction directly and consistently 
to presidential election outcomes. It also offers a safeguard in polarized times; 
should extreme partisan elites momentarily gain power, chance could not bless 
them with multiple appointment opportunities since those must be earned with 
multiple election victories.  
More Representative Supreme Court Appointees. There is sizable literature 
advancing the idea that the judicial selection process is broken; complaints mostly 
focus on Senate confirmation, especially the high level of partisan rancor; endless 
delays and gridlock; and the lack of meaningful dialogue and debate.138 Reform 
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proposals abound and include banning the judicial filibuster,139 hiring expert 
counsel to question nominees,140 generating better questions,141 expediting 
confirmation for nominees drawn from a Senate-approved list,142 eliminating 
televised Senate hearings,143 adopting a supermajority requirement,144 and even 
electing Supreme Court Justices.145 
 If political feasibility is not an issue, we might first consider whether the 
Senate is even the appropriate institution to confirm judicial nominees. Equal state 
representation is a significant representational distortion, one that, according to 
Professors Frances Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer, has enabled more conservative 
Supreme Court Justices like Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito to be 
appointed than would have resulted from a more representative body.146 Some 
might consider the House to be superior in this respect. However, it also suffers 
from partisan polarization and a strong localistic perspective that might render it 
even less effective than the Senate in a confirmation role. The better solution might 
be to improve the representational qualities of the Senate. 
Of all the proposals to improve the Senate confirmation process, the most 
promising is a supermajority vote requirement of either three-fifths or two-thirds. 
This change is intended to encourage presidents to choose more confirmable and, 
thus, presumably more consensual, nominees. Some argue that we already have, in 
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effect, a two-thirds requirement given the ever-present filibuster threat.147 With 
only one exception, however—the nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas for 
the Chief Justice seat in 1968—the filibuster has only been used for lower-court 
nominees, not Supreme Court nominees.148 This has it exactly backwards. It is the 
Supreme Court, with its greater power to set constitutional policy, whose nominees 
demand a higher level of Senate approval compared to lower-court nominees.149 
So what difference would a supermajority requirement have made with 
respect to recent Supreme Court appointments? A three-fifths rule requiring sixty 
senators to confirm would have kept both Justices Alito and Thomas off the bench, 
as the former received only fifty-eight votes and the latter only fifty-two votes; 
perhaps those seats would have gone to more moderate nominees.150 In addition to 
Justices Alito and Thomas, a two-thirds confirmation rule requiring sixty-seven 
votes would have kept Justice Kagan (with only sixty-three votes) off the Court, as 
well as Justice Rehnquist (with only sixty-five votes) out of the Chief Justice 
seat.151 Because a higher threshold would change the dynamics of the confirmation 
process, it could also have put Justices Sotomayor and Rehnquist (as associate 
Justice) at risk for Senate rejection, as they each received only sixty-eight votes.152 
A supermajority rule is intended to encourage presidents to avoid choosing 
extreme or controversial Supreme Court nominees and to favor more moderate and 
mainstream candidates who are likely to command Senate support. For example, 
even a three-fifths requirement could have convinced President Reagan not to 
nominate Robert Bork and offer instead a more moderate candidate, which of 
course the Senate ultimately required him to do.153 An underlying assumption of 
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advocates of a supermajority rule is that it is the president’s aggressive nomination 
practices that have triggered partisan warfare in the Senate confirmation process;154 
thus, it is his behavior that must be altered. The important question is whether a 
supermajority rule will result in moderate or consensual nominees or just more 
bloodshed and stalemate. As Professors Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman point 
out, that depends critically on the ideological distribution of senators.155 A bell-
shaped distribution would likely compel the President to select a more moderate 
nominee satisfactory to the sixtieth senator.156 A more polarized (i.e., bipolar) 
distribution would not necessarily convince the President to select a more 
consensual nominee appealing to the sixtieth senator since that senator might, in 
addition to belonging to the opposite party, be significantly more distant 
ideologically.157 Another reason a supermajority rule might not produce the desired 
effect is that some presidents may care more about appealing to their party’s base 
than confirmation success; such presidents would not be affected by a 
supermajority rule.158 Because of these uncertainties, a three-fifths requirement is a 
more modest and less risky change than a two-thirds rule. 
Elect More Representative Presidents and Senators. The final set of reforms 
looks outside the courts, recognizing that changing courts requires changing the 
political institutions that construct them. The proposals of greatest interest here are 
those that seek to produce more representative elected officials, as they will in turn 
appoint more representative Justices. This might mean independent redistricting 
commissions that redraw House district lines with an eye toward electoral 
competition and effective representation, rather than incumbent safety and district 
homogeneity. Many scholars and commentators regard the representational 
distortions in the Senate as the most profound and enduring democratic defect in 
American politics. Abolishing the Senate outright or altering the basis of 
representation to promote greater equality in representation are both interesting 
possibilities. Another likely target of reformers concerned with growing 
polarization is the presidential nomination process. Currently, ideologically 
extreme voters and organized interests dominate the process, enhancing the 
prospects of candidates who are off-center and hurting the chances of those who 
are more moderate and representative. Finally, compulsory voting is advanced as a 
reform that could force more Americans to the polls, expanding the electorate and, 
thereby, diluting the influence of extreme voters.159 All of these reforms aim in the 
right direction, helping to elect more representative presidents and senators. 
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Democracy-assisting judicial review is a theme that has recently reemerged in 
normative constitutional scholarship. It asks the Supreme Court to use its power to 
vindicate the people’s views that have been stymied by a dysfunctional political 
process, a problem that has worsened in recent years. The main deficiency in this 
prescription is that it overstates the Court’s ability to compensate for problems like 
polarization and gridlock since it is a part of the interbranch strategies employed 
by partisan regimes. This was demonstrated in the area of reapportionment, 
typically seen as a classic example of democracy-assisting judicial review. It is 
also evident in recent Roberts Court decisions in the election-law field. 
This Article recommends abandoning the democracy-assisting idea and 
instead exploring ways to prevent the Court from being enlisted in extreme and 
unrepresentative causes. Reform ideas should focus on increasing and regularizing 
turnover on the Court and encouraging the selection of more representative 
Justices, an outcome made more likely by increasing the representativeness of the 
elected officials who choose the Justices. Absent a crisis, of course, it is highly 
unlikely that any such reforms will be adopted. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile 
exercise to think about how to enhance representational and consensus-building 
processes in the presence of growing partisan polarization. And it is a more 
valuable exercise than simply imploring the Justices be less partisan or suggesting 
that they defer to today’s laws that represent such fragile legislative compromises. 
Institutions and processes, and the incentives they create, must be changed if 
behavior is to be changed. The best we can do for the Court and for American 
democracy in 2020 and beyond is to construct better electoral processes that 
produce more representative leaders who, in turn, select more representative 
Justices, which aids the quest for true constitutional consensus. 
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